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THE DIVISION OF FOREIGN POLICY 
AUTHORITY BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITY AND THE MEMBER STATES: A 
SURVEY OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 
AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Both the European Community (EC) and the individual Mem-
ber States within the EC have the power to implement foreign policy 
through agreements, debt relief, economic sanctions, and other 
measures. In some cases these powers are exclusive, in others they 
are concomitant. This Note examine~ the foreign policy powers of 
the EC and of individual Member States, using the enactment of 
economic sanctions against South Africa to eradicate apartheid as a 
historical example of these powers. This discussion necessarily in-
corporates an analysis of the specific powers delegated to the EC 
and those reserved by the Member States and how they may conflict. 
Although the EC recently lifted all sanctions against South Africa, 
the manner in which the EC and the individual Member States 
functioned between 1975 and 1987 in their relations with South 
Africa provides a good basis for an analysis of the individual and 
concurrent powers of each. 
Part II of this Note examines the structure, allocation of re-
sponsibilities, and purpose of the EC. Part II also provides an 
introduction to the European Court of Justice and the internal and 
external economic relations of the EC. Part III focuses specifically 
on Articles 224 and 113 of the European Economic Community 
Treaty (EEC Treaty) and analyzes the exclusivity of the EC's actions 
under Article 113. Part IV presents a general background to South 
Africa and apartheid, followed by a detailed discussion of the EC's 
policies toward South Africa in four different time periods: 1975-
1977, 1978-1984, 1985, and 1986. This part also includes discussion 
of the individual actions of Member States toward South Africa and 
how these actions affect the EC's unified position. Part V analyzes 
the actions that Articles 224 and 113 of the EEC Treaty allow 
Member States to take individually, as well as the possible conse-
quences of these actions. Part VI concludes that in order to ensure 
the unity necessary to preserve the Common Market, actions against 
South Africa should be undertaken only by the EC as a whole, 
rather than by individual Member States. This Note considers how 
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Member State action or inaction in adopting individual and EC 
economic policy measures can retard the EC's progress toward a 
unified, effective foreign policy. 
II. THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 
A. Introduction 
The EC is comprised of three distinct communities. Belgium, 
France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and Holland established the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951, creating a 
common market in coal and steeP In 1957, the aforementioned 
countries established the European Economic Community (EEC) 
and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), which 
encompass other areas of economic and industrial life.2 From the 
beginning, these three bodies shared some common institutions, 
and since 1967, the EC Council and the EC Commission have 
governed all three. 3 In 1986, the Member States of the EC adopted 
the Single European Act (SEA), amending the existing treaties and 
calling for the progressive completion of the Internal Market by 
December 31, 1992.4 According to Article 8A of the EEC Treaty, 
as incorporated in the SEA,5 this "internal market shall comprise 
an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of 
goods, persons, services and capital [among the Member States] is 
ensured in accordance with the provisions of [the EEC] Treaty."6 
Notwithstanding the enactment of the SEA, the treaties gov-
erning each community remain intact, therefore, some of the rules 
that regulate activity in each community remain distinct. 7 Similarly, 
I TREATY INSTITUTING THE EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY [ECSC TREATY]. 
2 TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY [EEC TREATY]; TREATY 
ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMUNITY [EURATOM TREATY]. 
, TREATY ESTABLISHING A SINGLE COUNCIL AND A SINGLE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITIES AND ANNEXED DOCUMENTS, Apr. 8, 1965, reprinted in ERIC STEIN & PETER HAY, 
DOCUMENTS FOR LAW AND INSTITUTIONS IN THE ATLANTIC AREA 194-207 (1967). For a 
complete discussion of the governing institutions, see WILLIAM RAWLINSON & MALACHY P. 
CORNWELL-KELLY, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 2-10 (1990). 
Over the ensuing three decades, the EC gradually expanded to include twelve Member 
States; Denmark, Ireland, and Britain joined in 1972. See 19730.]. (L 2) 1. Greece acceded 
in 1979. See 1979 OJ. (L 291) 1. Spain and Portugal joined in 1985. See 1985 OJ. (L 302) 
1. 
4 1987 OJ. (L 169) I, art. 13 [hereinafter SEA]. 
5 Id. 
6 EEC TREATY art. 8A (as amended 1987). 
7 RAWLINSON & CORNWELL-KELLY, supra note 3, at 1. 
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the powers to legislate which the treaties confer upon the commu-
nities are different and, to some extent, so are the procedures and 
remedies of each treaty.8 The communities, however, usually apply 
the EEC Treaty, with its catch-all provisions, when the ECSC or 
Euratom Treaties lack applicable provisions to govern a particular 
legal issue.9 
Articles 1 through 8C of the EEC Treaty, as supplemented by 
the SEA, 10 embody the paramount goal of the EC: European unity. 11 
The EC expects to achieve this goal through measures promoting 
the following: the free movement of goods within a customs union; 
a common agricultural policy; the free movement of persons, ser-
vices, and capital; a common transport policy; a common commer-
cial policy; coordination of economic and monetary policies; and a 
competition free of distortions and restrictions. 12 The fundamental 
principle behind these measures, as discussed in Article 7 of the 
EEC Treaty, advocates non-discrimination among nationals of the 
Member States. 13 Articles 8A through 8C provide for the comple-
tion of this internal market for movement of goods, services, per-
sons, and capital by December 31, 1992.14 The SEA expressly de-
clares, however, that this date will not trigger automatic legal 
consequences. 15 In order to assist in the achievement of the EC's 
goal of a unified market, the SEA also facilitates the passing of 
additional legislation and introduces new, specific internal policy 
objectives regarding research and development as well as environ-
mental protection. 16 Since the enactment of the SEA, the EC has 
integrated in many areas. However, there is still a great deal of 
work to be accomplished before the goal of complete European 
unity can be realized. 
Most of the EC's integration achievements have resulted from 
domestic policy-setting. The EC has found it more difficult to in-
tegrate foreign policy.17 The EC has had less success with foreign 
policy matters due to its limited power in this area under the EEC 
8 [d. 
9 [d. 
10 SEA, supra note 4, at arts. 6, 13-15. 
11 EEC TREATY arts. I-SC (as amended 19S7); see RAWLINSON & CORNWELL-KELLY, supra 
note 3, at 2. 
12 EEC TREATY arts. 3, 7. 
13 [d. art. 7. 
14 [d. arts. SA-SC. 
15 SEA, supra note 4, at Final Act. 
16 See id. at arts. 24-25. 
17 See infra part IV. 
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Treaty. Under the present structure of the EC, Member States 
retain all powers not expressly granted to the EC by treaty. Through 
these retained powers, the individual Member States have thwarted 
the EC's efforts to supplant Member State control over foreign 
relations. 18 The treaties establishing the EC delineate the powers of 
the EC and, therefore, govern the EC's foreign policy measures. 
These treaties form the limited basis for the EC's foreign economic 
relations. Foreign policies are often implemented through EC-wide 
or individual Member State agreements with another country. The 
validity and interpretation of these foreign policy agreements are 
decided by the Court of Justice of the European Communities 
(Court). 
B. Court of Justice of the European Communities 
According to Article 164 of the EEC Treaty, the role of the 
Court in the EC is to "ensure that in the interpretation and appli-
cation of [the EEC] Treaty the law is observed."19 Through its 
interpretations of the various treaties, the Court has played a key 
role in determining the relative authority of the Member States and 
the EC.20 
The Court has original, consultative, and advisory jurisdic-
tion. 21 In its original jurisdiction, the Court may hear cases brought 
by or against any of the EC institutions and cases among Member 
States.22 The Court also has original jurisdiction to hear actions 
brought by the EC Commission against Member States seeking 
"declarations that [the Member States] have failed to comply with 
[EC] law."23 In its consultative jurisdiction, the Court gives rulings 
on the proper interpretation of the treaties, EC legislation, and EC 
conventions.24 
In addition to original and consultative jurisdiction, the Court 
has advisory jurisdiction to render "opinions" under Article 228(1) 
of the EEC Treaty.25 Article 228(1) concerns the negotiation and 
conclusion of agreements by the EC or individual Member States 
18 [d. 
19 EEC TREATY art. 164. 
20 See infra part III.B-C. 
21 RAWLINSON & CORNWELL-KELLY, supra note 3, at 8-9. 
22 [d. at 8. 
23 [d. at 9. 
24 [d. 
25 EEC TREATY art. 228(1). 
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with non-Member States or international organizations.26 It pro-
vides that, where such an agreement is contemplated, the EC Com-
mission or any Member State may seek, before the parties enter 
into the agreement, the opinion of the Court as to whether the 
agreement is consistent with the provisions of the EEC Treaty.27 
Although this aspect of the Court's jurisdiction is advisory, 
whereby it gives only an "opinion" under Article 228, the Court has 
the authority to rule definitively on the vital question of the relative 
agreement-making powers of the EC and individual Member 
States.28 The purpose of this advisory jurisdiction is to anticipate 
problems that might arise if, at the conclusion of an international 
agreement, someone questions the agreement's validity under and 
compatibility with the EEC Treaty.29 The Court thus plays an im-
portant role in helping define the respective powers of the EC and 
the individual Member States within the realm of foreign policy 
through its analysis of the treaties. 
C. Foreign Economic Relations 
The treaties establishing the EC are the legal equivalent of a 
constitution,30 and, as such, when EC law applies, it takes prece-
dence over conflicting national statutes and constitutions.31 Yet, 
despite this new legal order,32 Member States actually retain a fair 
degree of sovereignty in the foreign relations area. 33 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 See Opinion 1175, Opinion of the Court Given Pursuant to Article 228 of the EEC 
Treaty of 11 November 1975, 1975 E.C.R. 1355, 1360-61, [1976 Transfer Binder] Common 
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) ~ 8365 at 7637, 7641-42 (1976). 
29 Id. at 1360-61, [1976 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at 7641. 
30 Case 26/63, N.V. Algemene Transport-En Expeditie Onderneming Van Gend & Loos 
v. Nederlandse Administratie Der Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 1, 12, [1961-1966 Transfer 
Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) ~ 8008 at 7206, 7214 (1963) [hereinafter Van Gend & 
Loos]. "This Treaty [EEC Treaty] is more than an agreement which merely creates mutual 
obligations between the contracting states .... Community law has an authority which can 
be invoked by [Member States'] nationals before [national] courts and tribunals." Id.; see also 
Koen Lenaerts, Constitutionalism and the Many Faces of Federalism, 38 AM. J. CaMP. L. 205, 
208-10 (1990). 
3! Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 585, 593-94, [1961-1966 Transfer Binder] 
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) ~ 8023 at 7384, 7390 (1964); Joseph Weilee, Community, Member 
States and European Integration: Is the Law Relevant?, 21 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 39, 43-47 
( 1982). 
32 Van Gend & Loos, 1963 E.C.R. at 12, [1961-1966 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. 
Rep. (CCH) at 7214. According to the Court, "the Community constitutes a new legal order 
of international law for the benefit of which the states have limited their sovereign rights, 
albeit within limited fields .... " Id. 
33 See, e.g., infra part IV.A.3-4. 
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As the EC derives its authority solely from the EEC Treaty, the 
EEC Treaty establishes the theoretical parameters of the EC's au-
thority in the foreign relations arena.34 The EC's authority in ex-
ternal relations is thus limited to the power to exercise its "legal 
personality,"35 as delineated in the EEC Treaty, in international 
arenas. For example, in connection with its common commercial 
policy36 or in other areas of EC competence,37 the EC may negotiate 
treaties and agreements with non-Member States or international 
organizations. 
However, it is unclear to what extent the EC's powers are 
exclusive. Generally, where the EEC Treaty grants the EC exclusive, 
internal authority over a particular subject area, the Court will 
interpret the EEC Treaty as also granting exclusive, international 
authority over the same subject area.38 Thus, for example, the EC's 
exclusive authority to establish common commercial policy, includ-
ing trade and tariff policy,39 ostensibly prohibits Member States 
from concluding trade or tariff agreements in their own names, 
even if acting cooperatively.40 In practice, however, the Court has 
not strictly enforced or uniformly applied this principle.41 Concur-
rent negotiations are the standard in many areas where the EC 
theoretically maintains exclusive internal authority.42 
The Member States' influence over the direction of EC foreign 
policy remains significant despite the fact that the EC is granted 
34 See EEC TREATY art. 4(1). Article 4(1) provides that each Community institution shall 
carry out the powers of the Community acting "within the limits of the powers conferred 
upon it by this Treaty." [d.; see also EURATOM TREATY art. 3(1); ECSC TREATY art. 3; Lenaerts, 
supra note 30, at 207-08. 
35 EEC TREATY art. 210. 
36 [d. arts. 113, 228. 
37 [d. art. 238 (as amended 1987). 
38 See Opinion 1175, 1975 E.C.R. at 1364, [1976 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. 
(CCH) at 7643; see also Pierre Pescatore, External Relations in the Case-Law of the Court of justice 
of the European Communities, 16 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 615, 622 (1979). 
39 EEC TREATY arts. 110-16. 
40 See Opinion 1175, 1975 E.C.R. at 1364, [1976 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. 
(CCH) at 7637; see also Pescatore, supra note 38, at 622. 
41 Opinion 1178, Opinion of the Court of 4 October 1978 Given Pursuant to the Second 
Subparagraph of Article 222(1) of the EEC Treaty, 1979 E.C.R. 2871, 2916-18, [1978-1979 
Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) ~ 8600 at 8755,8782-83 (1979). Opinion I178 
is discussed infra at note 63. 
42 For example, since the decision in Opinion 1178, the EC and Member States negotiate 
all commodity agreements concurrently. See Eric Stein in collaboration with Louis Henkin, 
Towards a European Foreign Policy? The European Foreign Affairs System from the Perspective of the 
United States Constitution, in I INTEGRATION THROUGH LAW bk. 3, 3, 47 (Mauro Cappelletti et 
at. eds., 1986). 
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exclusive jurisdiction over certain foreign economic issues.43 As a 
result, the retention of some foreign economic policy sovereignty 
by the Member States limits the potential for Europe to speak 
cohesively with one voice.44 Nevertheless, Member States do not 
retain unqualified independence in their foreign economic rela-
tions, even outside the areas of the EC's express external authority, 
because the EEC Treaty places broad restrictions on Member State 
activity. For example, in Article 116 of the EEC Treaty, the Member 
States, "in respect of all matters of particular interest to the common 
market, [must] proceed within the framework of international or-
ganizations of an economic character only by common action. "45 
Moreover, Article 5 of the EEC Treaty requires Member States to 
"abstain from any measure which could jeopardize the attainment 
of the objectives of [the EEC] Treaty."46 Therefore, although the 
Member States retain sovereignty over certain foreign economic 
areas, Member States' individual powers are not entirely unre-
stricted because their foreign relations activities will affect the EC 
objective. 
It is apparent that economic decisions affect the foreign rela-
tions policies the EC implementsY It is also apparent that non-
economic foreign relations policies are becoming more dependent 
upon economic means, such as sanctions.48 Hence, given this inter-
dependence between foreign relations and economic policy, coor-
dination and integration of the authorities in these areas is crucial. 
Clearly, a proper understanding of the allocation of powers over 
foreign policy between the Member States and the EC is necessary 
in order to analyze the use of economic means to effect foreign 
policy. 
III. MEMBER STATE ACTION UNDER ARTICLES 224 AND 113 OF THE 
EEC TREATY 
Two Articles of the EEC Treaty, Articles 224 and 113, delineate 
who may enact what policies under what circumstances.49 Article 
224 delegates to each Member State the authority to maintain peace 
43 EEC TREATY arts. 67-74 (as amended 1987). 
44 See, e.g., infra notes 108-09 and accompanying text. 
45 EEC TREATY art. 116. 
46 [d. art. 5; see also EURATOM TREATY art. 192; ECSC TREATY art. 86. 
47 See, e.g., Roy H. GINSBERG, FOREIGN POLICY ACTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 
141 (1989) (discussing economic factors affecting foreign relations decisions made by EC). 
48 See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 93, 134-140. 
49 EEC TREATY arts. 224, 113. 
104 BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 12:97 
and international security.50 Article 113 in turn delegates to the EC 
exclusive authority over "common commercial policy."51 An analysis 
of each of these provisions will demonstrate that Article 224 trumps 
Article 113 when peace and international security are involved.52 
Interpreting these provisions first in a general sense, and second as 
they apply to the EC's apartheid policies, will illustrate how together 
these two provisions affect independent actions taken by the indi-
vidual Member States. 
A. Article 224 
Article 224 of the EEC Treaty provides for a reservation of 
sovereignty on behalf of the Member States. 53 Article 224 stipulates 
that: 
Member States shall consult each other with a view to taking 
together the steps needed to prevent the functioning of the 
common market being affected by measures which a Member 
State may be called upon to take ... in order to carry out 
obligations it has accepted for the purpose of maintaining peace 
and international security. 54 
If such measures distort competition in the common market, the 
EC Commission and the interested Member States will try to rec-
oncile the measures with the EEC Treaty.55 Article 224 makes clear 
that the Member States may, if they wish to comply with interna-
tional legal obligations with respect to the maintenance of interna-
tional peace and security, consider themselves, apart from proce-
dural requirements, free from their obligations under EC law. 56 
B. Article 113 
Article 113 of the EEC Treaty calls for a "common commercial 
policy" based on uniform principles as implemented by the EC.57 
The Court issued two opinions establishing guidelines for inter-
50 Id. art. 224. 
51 Id. art. 113. 
52 Id. arts. 224, 113. 
53 Id. art. 224. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. art. 225. 
56 HANS SMIT & PETER E. HERZOG, THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY; 
A COMMENTARY ON THE EEC TREATY 6-216.85 (1989). 
57 EEC TREATY art. 113. 
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preting the scope of and applying Article 113.58 On November 11, 
1975, the Court, in its first opinion, examined the basis of common 
commercial policy.59 The transaction discussed in Opinion 1175 re-
quired the setting of minimum conditions for export credits.60 The 
Court determined that Member States should apply the term "com-
mon commercial policy" set forth in Article 113 in a broad sense.61 
The Court further recognized that the transaction at issue in 
Opinion 1175 fell within the context of export policy mentioned 
explicitly in Article 113's delineation of "common commercial pol-
icy."62 Therefore, the EC had the power to conclude the agreement. 
In another opinion, 1178, the Court again examined the scope 
of the common commercial policy and the interpretation of Article 
113.63 The Court supported a broad reading of Article 113 by 
stating that the power of the EC to implement a commercial "policy" 
based on "uniform principles" required the administration of ex-
ternal trade from a broad perspective.64 The Court therefore held 
that the list of subjects under the heading of "common commercial 
policy" in Article 113 was not all-inclusive.65 The Court refused to 
interpret Article 113 restrictively.66 "A restrictive interpretation of 
the concept of common commercial policy," the Court reasoned, 
"would risk causing disturbances in intra-Community trade by rea-
son of the disparities which would then exist in certain sectors of 
economic relations with non-Member countries."67 Opinions 1175 
and 1178 establish the EC's power to create agreements in any area, 
whether listed in Article 113 or not, as long as they can be classified 
as furthering common commercial policy. 
58 Opinion 1178, 1979 E.C.R. 2871, [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. 
(CCH) ~ 8600 at 8755; Opinion 1175, 1975 E.C.R. 1355, [1976 Transfer Binder] Common 
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) ~ 8365 at 7637. 
59 Opinion 1175, 1975 E.C.R. at 1362-63, [1976 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. 
(CCH) at 7642-43. 
60 Id. at 1357-59, [1976 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at 7639-40. 
61 Id. at 1362, [1976 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at 7642. 
62 Id. at 1363, [1976 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at 7643 (discussing 
EEC TREATY art. 113(1». 
63 Opinion 1178, 1979 E.C.R. 2871, [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. 
(CCH) ~ 8600. The agreement in question involved an attempt "to achieve a balanced growth 
between supply and demand for natural rubber" to stabilize prices in the long run for both 
exporters and importers, as well as to ensure a reliable supply for importers. Id. at 2903, 
[1978-1979 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at 8775-76. 
64 Id. at 2913, [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at 8781. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
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C. Exclusivity Under Article 113 
A second issue addressed in Opinion 1175 was whether the EC 
retains exclusive power over "common commercial policy" actions 
it formulates. 68 In the opinion, the Court reasoned that "common 
commercial policy" under Article 113 should be interpreted in the 
context of EC operations, with a view toward protecting the interests 
of the Member States.69 Under this analysis, each Member State 
must seek to accommodate the interests of the other Member 
States.70 This interpretation of Article 113 demonstrates its similar-
ity to Article 224: Member States must not act in ways that would 
adversely affect the EC or other Member States. If a Member State 
acts unilaterally to pursue its own interest in an external relation 
while the EC is concurrently enacting policies in that realm, there 
is a risk that the Member State will jeopardize the common interests 
of all EC Member States. 71 Therefore, in fields covered by common 
commercial policy, it is difficult if not impossible for the EC and 
Member States to exercise concurrent powers.72 
In Opinion 1178, the Court went beyond Opinion 1175 and 
determined who maintains exclusive power, the EC or Member 
States, when the common commercial policy provisions are not the 
only provisions regulating an agreement. 73 The Court stated that if 
part of an agreement comes under common commercial policy, the 
agreement cannot be withdrawn from the exclusive competence of 
the EC in the name of general economic policy.74 Therefore, the 
EC's power is exclusive over any area that falls in any way under 
common commercial policy. 
D. Application to EC's Apartheid Policies 
The use of economic sanctions in foreign matters best exem-
plifies how the concurrent and exclusive foreign powers of the 
68 Opinion 1175, 1975 E.C.R. at 1363, [1976 Transfer Binder) Common Mkt. Rep. 
(CCH) at 7643. 
69 [d. at 1364, [1976 Transfer Binder) Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at 7643. 
70 [d. at 1363-64, [1976 Transfer Binder) Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at 7643. 
71 [d. at 1364, [1976 Transfer Binder) Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at 7643. 
72 /d. 
73 Opinion 1178, 1979 E.C.R. at 2914, [1978-1979 Transfer Binder) Common Mkt. Rep. 
(CCH) at 8781. Absent any other implications, a Member State may act with regard to purely 
"general economic policies." [d. Opinion 1178 considered who has competence when an 
agreement concerns both common commercial policy and general economic policies. [d. 
74 [d. The Court did note, however, that if a Member State was to bind itself financially 
in certain clauses in the agreement, separate participation by that individual Member State 
in the decision-making process would be justified, and exclusive EC competence would be 
precluded. [d. at 2918, [1978-1979 Transfer Binder) Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at 8783. 
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Member States and the EC interact and at times conflict to frustrate 
the achievement of a unified foreign policy. As noted earlier, the 
EC's use of economic means to achieve foreign relations goals is 
widespread today.75 The EC increasingly relies on economic policies 
to enable itself to negotiate with foreign governments.76 The EC 
also uses economic policies in attempts to pressure other govern-
ments into acting in manners consistent with EC goals and objec-
tives. 
A relevant example of such pressure is the economic action 
taken by the EC against South Africa between 1975 and 1987 to 
persuade the South African government to abolish apartheid. To 
achieve this goal, the EC utilized various economic sanctions.77 
These sanctions demonstrate two phenomena: first, the relative 
feebleness of the EC's policies toward South Africa before 1986; 
and second, the ability of the Member States to hamper the achieve-
ment of a forceful, cohesive EC foreign policy through economic 
measures.7S As will be demonstrated, Member States can impede 
the development of a cohesive policy in two ways.79 When economic 
actions are taken unilaterally by a Member State, or without com-
plete agreement among the Member States, the result may be the 
existence of multiple, incompatible measures, rendering the EC 
measures ineffective. Additionally, because of their sovereignty, 
Member States in some cases have been able to forestall a strong, 
unified EC foreign policy by preventing the implementation of 
certain economic sanctions. so The exercise of authority from 1975 
through 1987 by both the EC and Member States in connection 
with South Africa clearly demonstrates the scope and limitations of 
each entity's power. 
IV. EC's FOREIGN POLICIES TOWARD SOUTH AFRICA AND 
APARTHEID 
A. Apartheid 
Apartheid was the political platform of the South African con-
servative Nationalist party, which came to power in 1948, following 
75 See infra notes 93, 134-40 and accompanying text. 
76 [d. 
77 See infra part IV. 
78 [d. 
79 See infra notes 108-09, 142 and accompanying text. 
80 See infra note 142 and accompanying text. 
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World War II.8l The literal meaning of the term "apartheid" in 
Afrikaans is "separatehood."82 Afrikaaner nationalism and racial 
superiority were the ideological bases for the apartheid program.83 
Under the apartheid order, the government consolidated existing 
racial laws and added new ones to create a unified system of racial 
subjugation.84 
The South African legal system presents no effective recourse 
to bar the government from implementing racially oppressive pol-
icies, such as forced removal to homelands and denial of civil or 
voting rights for South African Blacks. The South African Consti-
tution contains no preclusive proclamation of fundamental political 
rights and provides for no judicial review of statutes.85 Rather, an 
extreme legal positivism controls the legal system in which no one 
can question or challenge Acts of Parliament, regardless of their 
content or consequences.86 The South African Parliament has en-
acted statutes to control the most intimate aspects of Black people's 
lives, including their residence,87 personal movement,88 employ-
ment,89 political expression,90 and sexuality.9l This web of apartheid 
81 JOHN DUGARD, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL ORDER 7 (1978). 
82 See CLAUDE PHILLIPS, THE AFRICAN POLITICAL DICTIONARY 35-36 (1984). 
83 See Elizabeth S. Landis, South African Apartheid Legislation I: Fundamental Structure, 71 
YALE L.J. 1, 16-17 (1961). 
84 DUGARD, supra note 81, at 55; see Landis, supra note 83, at 1 (discussing legal structure 
of apartheid, which remains fundamentally accurate in spite of recent reforms). 
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89 See, e.g., Black Building Workers Act, S. Afr. Stat. No. 27 (1951) (repealed 1980). The 
nationalist government enacted legislation to reserve certain jobs in each industry for Whites. 
The 1951 Black Building Workers Act required the training and registration of Black 
building workers. Id. §§ 10-11. An employer in the building industry was not permitted to 
employ a Black in White areas without the written consent of the Minister. Id. § 13. 
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statutes stands as one of the most intricate and intolerable systems 
ever devised for controlling the details of personal action through 
the legal system.92 
B. EC's Policies Toward South Africa 
1. 1975-1977 
The primary objective of the EC's South African policy is the 
total abolition of apartheid.93 On September 28, 1976, while ad-
dressing the United Nations, the President of the EC Council of 
Ministers issued the first EC statement on South Africa.94 Within a 
year, the EC used this statement to create an EC-wide, voluntary 
Code of Conduct (Code) for EC firms operating in South Africa.95 
In 1977, EC Foreign Ministers adopted the Code for EC com-
panies with subsidiaries, branches, or other representation in South 
Africa.96 The Code called on the companies to treat their employees 
equally and to do everything possible to support trade unions for 
Black South Africans.97 This voluntary code also asked businesses 
to provide, among other things, the following: a minimum wage at 
least fifty percent above the amount required to satisfy the basic 
needs of a family; equal pay for equal work; training programs to 
help Black South Africans move out of inferior jobs; fringe benefits, 
including housing, health services, pensions, educational funds, and 
unemployment insurance; and desegregated work places.98 As the 
aim of the Code was to help those suffering under the Apartheid 
regime, rather than to punish the South African government for 
allowing the regime to continue, the Code was an entirely positive 
measure taken by the EC.99 
2. 1978-1984 
From 1978 to 1984, the Code was the EC's only foreign policy 
measure used to achieve change in South Africa. 1oo The EC de-
9. See generally DUGARD, supra note 81, at 53-55 (discussing law of apartheid). 
os 1985-1986 EUR. PARL. Doc. (COM xx) 7 (1986) [hereinafter Working Documents]. 
94 Martin Holland, Three Approaches for Understanding European Political Cooperation: A 
Case-Study of EC-South African Policy, 25 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 295, 297 (1987). 
95 Code of Conduct for European Community Companies with Subsidiaries, Branches or Repre-
sentation in South Africa, reprinted in 24 INT'L L.M. 1477-79 (1985) [hereinafter Code]. Com-
pliance with the Code is voluntary. 
96 Id. at 1475. 
97 Id. at 1477. 
98 Id. at 1478. 
99 See id. at 1477-79. 
100 Holland, supra note 94, at 297. 
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signed the Code's provisions to attempt to alleviate the effects of 
apartheid legislation with regard to employment. In practice, how-
ever, the apartheid legislation constrained the operation of the 
Code's guidelines. 101 Until 1984, the EC's efforts did in fact help to 
improve the situation of the South African Blacks affected by apart-
heid. 102 Because the Code did not provide the South African gov-
ernment with any incentives to eradicate apartheid, the Code did 
little, if anything, toward ending apartheid. 
In September 1984, escalating civil unrest, renewed Western 
media attention, and intensified anti-apartheid lobbying forced the 
EC to reevaluate "the Code as an instrument designed to eradicate 
apartheid. "103 In 1985, the South African government proclaimed 
a state of emergency in parts of the country and refused meetings 
with Bishop Tutu and other members of the Black majority.lo4 
These actions reinforced the Member States' belief that they must 
bring the apartheid system to an end.105 
3. 1985 Policy 
The EC's initial response to the state of emergency imposed by 
the South African government was to issue a Joint Declaration on 
July 22, 1985.106 This Declaration reaffirmed previous statements 
made by the EC that urged the abolition of apartheid. 107 On July 
25, a strict unilateral French action disturbed this seemingly unified 
EC position: France recalled its Ambassador, prohibited new in-
vestment in South Africa, and formulated a UN resolution calling 
for comprehensive international, negative sanctions. lOB This unilat-
eral French action undermined the effectiveness of any unified EC 
actions taken against South Africa.lOg 
On July 31, in an attempt to coordinate an "ostensibly floun-
dering policy" and to maintain some measure of diplomatic unity, 
the EC recalled all of its Ambassadors in preparation for a meeting 
101 Id. 
102 Working Documents, supra note 93, at 26, 31. 
103 Holland, supra note 94, at 30 I. 
104 European Community: Actions and Statements of Foreign Ministers, reprinted in 24 INT'L 
L.M. 1474 (1985) [hereinafter Actions and Statements of Foreign Ministers]. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
108 Holland, supra note 94, at 301. 
109 Note, A Community Within the Community: Prospects for Foreign Policy Integration in the 
European Community, 103 HARv. L. REV. 1066, 1074 (1990). 
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of the Foreign Ministers to discuss the EC's response. IIO Even this 
act of collective planning ultimately lacked uniformity. III While 
Denmark officially closed its consulate, Britain, in contrast, insisted 
that the recall of its Ambassador "was just for 'consultation' and did 
not imply an alteration in Britain's policy of constructive dia-
logue."112 To help counteract the negative effects of the Member 
States' divergent attitudes toward South Africa, the EC Committee 
on Development and Cooperation passed a resolution reiterating 
the EC's total condemnation of the apartheid system in all its 
forms.113 
An EC investigative committee then conducted a three-day tour 
of South Africa on August 30,1985. 114 On September 9, the Council 
of Foreign Ministers (Council) discussed the investigative commit-
tee's report about that visit. I 15 The investigative committee success-
fully conveyed to the South African government the EC's "grave 
concern . . . at the lack of any specific steps· towards abolishing 
apartheid and at the resulting deterioration of the situation in South 
Africa."116 The investigative committee called for the lifting of the 
state of emergency, the release of Nelson Mandela and the other 
political prisoners, as well as a "commitment by the South African 
government to end apartheid and to dismantle discriminatory leg-
islation."117 The Council then discussed possible measures the EC 
could take to persuade the South African government to accede to 
its wishes. IIB 
Although at this meeting the EC fell short of endorsing eco-
nomic sanctions (despite French advocacy), the Council proposed a 
joint package of measures. ll9 These new policies, among other 
things, called for the withdrawal of Member States' military attaches 
110 Holland, supra note 94, at 301; see also Actions and Statements of Foreign Ministers, supra 
note 104, at 1475-76. 
III Holland, supra note 94, at 301. 
112 [d. 
113 Working Documents, supra note 93, at 57. 
114 Actions and Statements of Foreign Ministers, supra note 104, at 1479. The EC Committee 
consisted of the Commissioner responsible for External Relations, Willy de Clerq, and the 
Foreign Ministers of Luxembourg, Italy, and The Netherlands-Jacques Poos, Giulio An-
dreotti, and Hans Van Den Brock, respectively. Holland, supra note 94, at 301. 
115 Actions and Statements of Foreign Ministers, supra note 104, at 1479. All Member States 
attended this meeting. Spain and Portugal attended as observers. !d.; Holland, supra note 
94, at 301. 
116 Actions and Statements of Foreign Ministers, supra note 104, at 1480. 
117 [d. 
liB [d. 
119 [d. at 1481; Holland, supra note 94, at 301. 
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to Pretoria, banned nuclear collaboration, and banned the sale of 
EC oil and sensitive technology. 120 France's unilateral actions in July 
1985, demonstrated its determination to sanction South Africa and 
suggested France's agreement with the proposed joint package of 
economic sanctions. Subsequently, on September 4, 1985, Germany 
unilaterally withdrew export guarantees for exports to South Africa, 
thus suggesting Germany's agreement with the proposed joint pack-
age of economic sanctions. '21 Britain, however, continued to oppose 
such economic sanctions until September 25, 1985, two months after 
the imposition of the state of emergency. 122 At the September 9th 
meeting of the Council, Britain was, therefore, alone in objecting 
to the proposal, stalling any EC-wide policy for another few 
weeks. 123 
The lack of unanimity suspended the goal of a unified EC 
response beyond rhetorical condemnation. Faced with mounting 
EC and UN criticism, however, Britain finally adopted the new EC 
policy on September 25, 1985. 124 The announcement of a revised 
Code on November 19, 1985 strengthened the unified EC posi-
tion. 125 The revised Code placed greater emphasis on promoting 
South Africa's relations with Black trade unions, training and pro-
motion, and supplementary benefits. 126 Although this EC policy 
presented a united front to South Africa which, along with the 
revised Code, helped South African Blacks, it did not ease apart-
heid. Fighting apartheid required stronger measures, and the EC 
did not take any additional action until the second half of 1986. 127 
This inaction was due in part to Britain's continuing opposition to 
more stringent economic sanctions. '28 Britain's successful strategy 
illustrates how the opposition of one Member State toward unified 
120 Actions and Statements of Foreign Ministers, supra note 104, at 1481; Holland, supra note 
94, at 30l. 
121 Holland, supra note 94, at 302. Germany undertook this withdrawal of export guar-
antees in response to a moratorium on foreign loan repayments imposed by South Africa. 
/d. 
122 Actions and Statements of Foreign Ministers, supra note 104, at 1481. 
123 [d. 
124 [d. Nevertheless, the change in position was superficial rather than substantive. 
Britain's government already followed all but one of the provisions-the withdrawal of 
military attaches. Holland, supra note 94, at 302. 
125 [d. 
126 [d. 
127 [d. 
128 [d. 
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economic action is sufficient to halt EC economIC action that is 
geared toward affecting foreign policy. 
4. 1986 Policy 
Due to its OpposItIon toward economic sanctions, Britain's 
membership in the EC effectively prevented the expansion of the 
EC's South African policy during the first half of 1986. 129 The EC 
could not impose more stringent sanctions on South Africa because 
Britain's opposition precluded a unified approach. The effect of 
Britain's refusal to join the other Member States in approving sanc-
tions provided South Africa with a loophole to circumvent any 
sanctions actually imposed. Due to the lack of trade barriers among 
the Member States, goods could flow between South Africa and the 
EC through Britain, and the other Member States were powerless 
to prevent it. 
Not until the Council meeting of June 26, 1986, did the EC, 
with Britain finally in agreement, decide that more unified actions 
were necessary.130 The EC, however, granted a delay of three 
months before implementing any new measures. 131 In the interim, 
acting in his capacity as President of the Council, Sir Geoffrey Howe 
of Britain visited South Africa. 132 Following this visit, Britain 
adopted certain sanctions and agreed to implement any EC decision 
to ban the import of coal, iron, steel, and gold coins from South 
Africa. 133 
On September 15, 1986, due to Britain's acceptance of further 
economic sanctions against South Africa, "the EC finally moved 
toward affirmative limited measures."134 On September 27, 1986, 
the EC agreed to ban both the importation of steel and iron 135 
under Article 71 of the ECSC Treaty,136 and new investment in 
South Africa 137 under Articles 67 and 235 of the EEC Treaty.138 
Furthermore, on October 27, the EC enacted legislation proscribing 
129 [d. 
130 [d. 
131 [d. 
132 [d. 
133 [d. 
134 [d. 
135 [d. 
136 ECSC TREATY art. 71. 
137 Holland. supra note 94, at 302. 
13" EEC TREATY arts. 67, 235. 
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the sale of kruggerands l39 pursuant to Article 113 of the EEC 
Treaty. 140 Although the EC proposed a coal embargo, Germany and 
Portugal both opposed it. l41 In order to continue to present a uni-
fied picture to South Africa, the EC did not introduce this sanc-
tion.142 
The EC's actions with respect to South Africa through 1987 
provide a good background against which one can study the relative 
powers of the EC and the Member States. Although the EC recently 
removed all sanctions against South Africa, an analysis of this period 
demonstrates the interaction between the EC and the Member 
States as it relates to the use of economic actions to achieve foreign 
relations goals. 
5. Analysis 
The 1975-1987 time period was selected because it was the 
height of EC activity relating to South Africa. Within this time 
frame, important aspects of the EC-Member State foreign policy 
powers relationship became apparent. This survey of recent EC 
action toward South Africa demonstrates how Member States can 
effectively prevent the EC from developing a cohesive and unified 
policy that is strong enough to accomplish the EC's goal of abolish-
ing apartheid. There are several possible explanations for the Mem-
ber States' actions including, but not limited to, disagreement with 
EC policy and desire to retain sovereignty. One Member State's 
inaction or opposition to a proposed foreign policy measure is 
sufficient to prevent the EC from implementing such a policy mea-
sure. Thus, Member State sovereignty in certain economic areas 
retards the EC's movement toward a unified foreign policy. 
Notwithstanding this effect of Member State sovereignty, the 
EC has used its EEC Treaty powers to achieve some success in 
implementing limited sanctions against South Africa. 143 Once the 
EC has so acted, the threshold issue then becomes whether a Mem-
ber State has the authority to pursue a policy concomitantly that 
either contradicts or differs from the EC policy. Specifically, what 
power remains with individual Member States when the EC has 
implemented economic sanctions against South Africa? 
139 Holland, supra note 94, at 302. 
140 EEC TREATY art. 113. 
141 Holland, supra note 94, at 303. 
142 [d. 
143 See supra notes 124-39 and accompanying text. 
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V. EXCLUSIVITY OF EC ACTION TOWARD SOUTH AFRICA 
A. Power of Member States to Enact Sanctions Under Article 224 
In order to determine the validity of a Member State's adoption 
of unilateral measures, one must classify the measures involved, 
thereby establishing the allocation of powers between the Member 
States and the EC.144 In the event the classification is trade measures 
rather than sanctions, the power to enact the measures would rest 
with the EC unless the power of the Member States continued to 
exist by virtue of an express provision of EC law. 145 If the sanctions 
do not fall under trade policy, and thus are not classified as trade 
measures, a Member State can implement sanctions individually in 
accordance with Article 224 after consulting with the other Member 
States. 
The Security Council of the United Nations labeled apartheid 
a system that "seriously disturbs international peace and security."146 
If the EC regarded apartheid as a security rather than trade matter, 
Article 224 would permit unilateral action by a Member State in 
sanctioning South Africa to protect international peace and secu-
rity.147 A group of international law professors in Holland viewed 
apartheid in this manner. 148 Their analysis concluded that unilateral 
action against South Africa qualified as sanctions, not trade mea-
sures, because the intent was to foster international peace and se-
curity rather than affect commercial policy. 149 The group assumed, 
therefore, that while Article 224 prohibits Member States from 
individually enacting trade measures, it does not prohibit the Mem-
ber States from individually enacting sanctions. 15o The issue of ex-
clusivity under Article 224 thus necessarily turns on the classification 
of the measures involved. 
B. Power of Member States to Enact Sanctions Under Article 113 
Because the EEC Treaty does not expressly delegate authority 
over the adoption of economic sanctions, if any such measure falls 
144 See supra part III.A-C. 
145 Id. 
146 S.C. Res. 473, U.N. SCOR, 35th Sess., 2231st mtg., at 18, U.N. Doc. S/RES/473 
(1980). 
147 See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text. 
148 Richard H. Lauwaars, The Interrelationship Between United Nations Law and the Law of 
Other International Organizations, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1604, 1614 (1984). 
149 Id. at 1615. 
150 Id. 
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under the rubric of "common commercial policy," Member States 
must defer to the powers of the EC pursuant to Article 113. 151 The 
justification for the broad interpretation given to Article 113, which 
precludes Member State action where the EC has acted in an area 
under common commercial policy,152 is the potential damage that 
unilateral measures of the Member States could inflict upon the 
functioning of the Common Market. For example, the punitive 
measures taken by the French in response to the state of emergency 
imposed by South Africa in 1985 underlined the relative feebleness 
of the Joint Declaration issued three days earlier, which had sup-
posedly been the product of a unified EC position.153 Hence, in 
order to prevent Member States from undermining the effective-
ness of the Common Market, it is entirely logical that the EC should 
retain exclusive control over all aspects affecting common commer-
cial policy. 
To determine if EC prior sanctions preclude unilateral Member 
State sanctions under Article 113, one must determine whether the 
EC's power is exclusive. 154 The first issue pertaining to exclusivity 
under Article 113 concerns the meaning of the "common commer-
cial policy," and whether the EC's sanctions against South Africa 
fall into this definition. 155 If the sanctions are actually restrictions 
on trade with a non-Member State, they would appear to fall within 
the realm of common commercial policy under current Court opin-
ions. Although the Article 113 list does not include agreements 
regulating external trade,156 under the reasoning of Opinion 1178 
it may still fall within the scope of Article 113 if any part of the 
agreement falls under common commercial policy.157 Thus, given 
the expansive interpretation of commercial policy adopted in Opin-
ion 1175158 and Opinion 1178,159 any economic sanctions would ap-
pear to qualify as common commercial policy. 
151 EEC TREATY art. 113. 
152 See supra part III.B-D. 
153 See Holland, supra note 94, at 301. 
154 See supra part III.C. 
155 [d. 
156 See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
157 Opinion 1178, 1979 E.C.R. at 2914, [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. 
Rep. (CCH) at 8781; see also supra text accompanying note 74. 
158 Opinion 1175, Opinion of the Court Given Pursuant to Article 228 of the EEC Treaty 
of 11 November 1975, 1975 E.C.R. 1355, 1362, [1976 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. 
(CCH) ~ 8365 at 7637, 7642 (1976). 
159 Opinion 1178, Opinion of the Court of 4 October 1978 Given Pursuant to the Second 
Subparagraph of Article 222(1) of the EEC Treaty, 1979 E.C.R. 2871, 2913, [1978-1979 
Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) ~ 8600 at 8755, 8781. 
1992] EC FOREIGN POLICY AUTHORITY 117 
The possibility still exists, however, that a sanctions agreement 
among the Member States may include foreign policy measures 
enforceable under general economic policy rather than under com-
mon commercial policy.160 Nevertheless, even if the sanctions are 
outside common commercial policy, the sanctions may disturb intra-
Community trade by creating an imbalance in the degree of sanc-
tions levied against South Africa. Given this prospect and the broad 
interpretation of common commercial policy, even if the sanctions 
agreement is deemed a foreign policy measure, it will probably fall 
within the scope of common commercial policy under Article 113. 
In summary, the issue of whether a Member State may impose 
sanctions unilaterally will be addressed by examining whether the 
EC's action is exclusive. If the sanctions do fall within Article 113, 
this would appear to be an exclusive measure. The Court clearly 
stated in Opinion 1175 that EC actions relating to common com-
mercial policy bar unilateral actions by Member States. 161 In Opin-
ion 1178, the Court further stated that even if only a part of a 
measure falls under common commercial policy, the EC's authority 
will remain exclusive. 162 Therefore, it appears that pursuant to 
Article 113 any action by the EC precludes conflicting or different 
individual action by a Member State. 
C. Effects of Unilateral Action by the Member States on the EC 
Coordinated EC-Member State action is essential to successful 
and efficient unification. Economic integration, however, will hinder 
the Member States' ability to enact unilateral foreign policies, as 
individual economic measures, such as Member State sanctions, will 
be prohibited. 163 Additionally, if the trade barriers within the EC 
actually are removed, the EC foreign policy to emerge most likely 
will be the "least restrictive foreign policy" of any of the Member 
States-in reality if not officially.164 For example, if Britain took a 
more relaxed stand toward South Africa, as it did in response to 
recent reforms made there, and therefore eased sanctions on min-
eral importation before the EC lifted its sanctions, it would be a 
160 See supra text accompanying note 74. 
161 Opinion 1175, 1975 E.C.R. at 1364, [1976 Transfer Binder) Common Mkt. Rep. 
(CCH) at 7643. 
162 Opinion 1178, 1979 E.C.R. at 2914, [1978-1979 Transfer Binder) Common Mkt. 
Rep. (CCH) at 8781. 
163 Note, supra note 109, at 1078. 
164 [d. 
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formidable task for other Member States to enforce the sanction 
when there are no trade barriers within the EC.165 This hypothetical 
situation demonstrates how individual action by· a Member State 
could adversely affect the unity for which the EC constantly strives. 
Therefore, the allowance of individual economic action by the Mem-
ber States in foreign policy areas jeopardizes commercial unity and 
the functioning of the Common Market and constrains the EC's 
ability to pursue integrated foreign policies. 
D. Potential Court Interpretation 
When either the EC or a Member State enacts foreign policies, 
the actions may be challenged before the Court. The validity of a 
sanctions agreement may be challenged on the basis of whether the 
sanctioner has any authority to enact such a sanction and, if so, 
whether such authority is exclusive. The purpose of the EC's sanc-
tions agreements against South Africa during the 1970s and 1980s 
was to convey to the South African government that the EC would 
no longer tolerate the apartheid system. Accordingly, this was a 
foreign policy concern. Therefore, through their participation in 
the EC, the Member States had an interest in the EC's foreign policy 
rather than merely its commercial policy. If the EC's South African 
sanctions were challenged before the Court, the outcome would 
turn on whether the Court looks to the policies that the EC is setting 
forth, in this case a foreign policy, or looks to the mechanism 
through which the EC is imposing the policy-the economic sanc-
tions. 
If the Court chooses to view the matter solely as a foreign policy 
issue, then the Member States probably will be free to impose dif-
ferent or harsher sanctions on their own. If the Court instead 
chooses to consider the actual means utilized-the economic sanc-
tions-then it must decide if the sanctions are trade policies or 
common commercial policies or if they are policies to protect inter-
national peace and security. Should the Court deem the sanctions 
to be at least in part common commercial policy, this determination 
would preclude the Member States from acting under Article 113. 
If the Court, however, finds the sanctions are implemented solely 
to protect international peace and security, then Article 224 will 
allow the Member States to act unilaterally. 
165 Id. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
It remains unclear whether a Member State has the authority 
to act unilaterally in areas of foreign policy already governed by 
EC policy. The effects of such unilateral action on both the EC and 
other Member States are severe. This Note has revealed that a 
Member State's unilateral actions against South Africa can render 
harsher sanctions by one Member State relatively ineffective and 
can have a negative effect on the unity of the EC as a whole. 
Accordingly, to preserve both the Common Market-a main goal 
of the EC-and the current broad definition of common commercial 
policy, Member States should not be able to take individual action 
against South Africa. As noted earlier, although the EC recently 
lifted all sanctions against South Africa and, barring the South 
African government's retreat to any of the recently abandoned 
discriminatory policies, the necessity of future sanctions is unlikely, 
the entire experience conveys important lessons. Furthermore, the 
conclusions drawn from this survey of EC action against South 
Africa will remain valid for future situations where the EC and/or 
the Member States use economic means to attain foreign relations 
goals. 
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